I find that to be an absurd reading of what I've said. I am not arguing that. I am giving you the reality of what the courts have said:
It's on private property, within the confines of their private property, and yet the court upheld it, even upholding it as content-neutral (which I find dubious myself, tbh).
The "narrowing" of freedom of speech is a reality of our courts. If you want to reword the "narrowing" to "suspension," that's up to you, but I'm telling you what the courts say. Their constitutional analysis is there to determine whether something IS a right, not whether to suspend it. When they say "unprotected speech," they're saying you don't have that right. You're claiming you do, and they're taking it from you. That's fine, but then me telling you what they say is not me arguing that your rights should be suspended. It's me telling you "the courts said you don't have this right. This right you think you have doesn't exist according to the courts."
I will give you this: I think the fact that the gov't can overcome a content-based free speech claim by using the Strict Scrutiny standard does make your choice to use "suspend" pretty compelling in those circumstances. The court is saying, "Okay, gov't, if you have a really, REALLY good reason, we'll allow this restriction." That's pretty close to a suspension, I agree with you there (although suspension often means temporary, which this isn't). It's one thing to say, "This speech doesn't count as protected," and another to say, "The speech would normally be protected, but by golly, that's a really good reason." I'm not saying the latter is necessarily wrong, but I think it does fit your accusation of a "suspension of rights" better.
https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-1/content-neutral-laws-burdening-speech wrote:A series of cases allowing speech to be regulated due to its “secondary effects” is related to these content-neutral standards.4 In Young v. American Mini Theater, the Court recognized a municipality’s authority to zone land to prevent deterioration of urban areas, upholding an ordinance providing that adult theaters showing motion pictures that depicted specified sexual activities or specified anatomical areas could not be located within 100 feet of any two other establishments included within the ordinance or within 500 feet of a residential area.5 The Court endorsed this approach in Renton v. Playtime Theatres, rejecting a constitutional challenge to a zoning ordinance restricting the locations of adult theaters after concluding that although the ordinance targeted businesses selling sexually explicit materials, the law was content-neutral because it was justified by studies showing adult theaters produced undesirable secondary effects, rather than being justified by reference to the content of the regulated speech.6 By contrast, for example, the Court rejected one city’s argument that it could prohibit as a nuisance “any movie containing nudity which is visible from a public place.” 7 Concluding that the ordinance was not well tailored to the city’s stated goals of protecting the privacy interests of passers-by or protecting children, the Court held instead that the law was an unconstitutional content-based regulation.8
It's on private property, within the confines of their private property, and yet the court upheld it, even upholding it as content-neutral (which I find dubious myself, tbh).
https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/366/36 wrote:Throughout its history this Court has consistently recognized at least two ways in which constitutionally protected freedom of speech is narrower than an unlimited license to talk. On the one hand, certain forms of speech, or speech in certain contexts, has been considered outside the scope of constitutional protection. . . . On the other hand, general regulatory statutes, not intended to control the content of speech but incidentally limiting its unfettered exercise, have not been regarded as the type of law the First or Fourteenth Amendment forbade Congress or the States to pass, when they have been found justified by subordinating valid governmental interests, a prerequisite to constitutionality which has necessarily involved a weighing of the governmental interest involved.
The "narrowing" of freedom of speech is a reality of our courts. If you want to reword the "narrowing" to "suspension," that's up to you, but I'm telling you what the courts say. Their constitutional analysis is there to determine whether something IS a right, not whether to suspend it. When they say "unprotected speech," they're saying you don't have that right. You're claiming you do, and they're taking it from you. That's fine, but then me telling you what they say is not me arguing that your rights should be suspended. It's me telling you "the courts said you don't have this right. This right you think you have doesn't exist according to the courts."
I will give you this: I think the fact that the gov't can overcome a content-based free speech claim by using the Strict Scrutiny standard does make your choice to use "suspend" pretty compelling in those circumstances. The court is saying, "Okay, gov't, if you have a really, REALLY good reason, we'll allow this restriction." That's pretty close to a suspension, I agree with you there (although suspension often means temporary, which this isn't). It's one thing to say, "This speech doesn't count as protected," and another to say, "The speech would normally be protected, but by golly, that's a really good reason." I'm not saying the latter is necessarily wrong, but I think it does fit your accusation of a "suspension of rights" better.
1 user liked this post: